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Abstract 
Institutions and organizations are defined by competing sociomaterial logics. 
Divergence between the ‘visible’ and the ‘hidden’ side of organization invites a 
critical work of ‘unveiling’. But such critique does not enable understanding of 
how coherency is accomplished between different modes of reason. This is 
performed in emergent third spaces, where parasitic relations are enacted. 
During moments of ‘crisis’ or ‘breach’, contradictions are both acknowledged and 
given concrescence. Management comes into being in the anticipation of its 
breaking. Four accounts of this process are offered – a discussion of a remark 
from Michel Serres’s The Parasite, a description of China Miélville’s novel The 
City and The City, stories from fieldwork in medium-secure forensic psychiatric 
units, and set of conceptual propositions. Together they perform a descriptive 
practice called ‘dark organization theory’ which analyses the functional aspects 
of divergence and breaking in management and organizational practices.  
Preface 
It is an established truism to point to the competing ‘sociomaterial logics’, or 
specific local modes of constituting meaning through shaping and ordering 
diverse discourses and materials, that define organizations and institutions. 
There are numerous agendas and programmes of action that rub up against each 
other in complex and often contradictory ways. This much we know from 
Organization Studies (Cooper, 2016; Knox et al, 2015), Science & Technology 
Studies (Mol, 2008; Mol & Law, 2002) and Institutional Theory (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Thornton et al, 2012). Naming these tensions can proceed in many 
different ways: formal and informal organization; espoused logic and theories-
in-use; low-level discourse and higher-level belief; systems and networks; 
positions and relations and so on. This dependency can also been framed in 
terms of ‘light’ and ‘darkness’ (see Burrell, 1997). Linstead et al, (2014) argue 
that negative or problematic behaviour on the part of organizational members 
and, indeed, the organization as whole, should not be seen as driven by external 
forces but rather as a constitutive ‘inside’. The neo-psychoanalytic ‘dark side’ or 
unacknowledged, unconscious aspect of organization manifests itself in terms of 
misbehavior, destruction, violence and oppression. This invites a critical labour 
of demonstrating how the dark side is enacted as a hidden hand within the overt 
work of organization (see Hanlon, 2015).  
The divergence and contrast between competing logics should not, however, 
lead us towards a notion of the visible and the hidden1. Organizations ‘function’ 
or ‘work’ in spite of, of perhaps because of, their inherently contradictory 
composition. There is no mystery to be unveiled here. We do not challenge 
management by pointing to a dark side that it scarcely takes the trouble to hide 
in the first place. But considering the coherence, or co-existence, of different 
logics raises the problem of how they intersect. At what point does one order of 
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reason transform into another? Where is the moment of switching or 
reversibility? Could this point, this space, be treated as a ‘third’ that emerges 
between any two (or more) given orders? What status could it be accorded? And 
in what sense would it be implicated in the management of incommensurability? 
These kinds of questions cannot really be approached ‘head on’, since to do so 
risks prematurely lapsing into one order of reason to the exclusion of others. If 
the ‘third space’ is emergent, if it denotes a provisional and elusive moment 
between the two (or more) visible forms of order, then we need to stage a 
performance where that emergence takes place. This essay consists of four 
individual pieces that perform the opening of thirdness through different means: 
philosophical, literary, empirical and conceptual2. Each individual piece gnaws at 
the same problem – the emergent gap or ‘breach’ that erupts between competing 
logics. Taken together they suggest a way of approaching organizational 
discontinuities in a sideways fashion, glancing out of the corner of our eyes. 
I 
The point of departure is with a remark that Michel Serres makes towards the 
start of The Parasite. The book opens by narrating La Fontaine’s version of the 
parable of the City Rat and the Country Rat. The story goes that the country 
cousin visits his relative in the city. At night, they creep out onto a kitchen table 
filled with the spoils of a feast. Both begin to take their fill until they are suddenly 
disturbed by a noise at the door and, taking fright, scurry away into the darkness. 
Serres offers a small diagram to illustrate the chain of actions involved in the 
story: 
<insert Figure 1 here> 
(Fig. 1 After Serres, 1982: 4) 
The diagram indicates a succession or chain of thefts or parasitisms. The food on 
the table comes from somewhere, it is the booty of an initial theft left laying on 
the table. The city rat ‘intercepts’ this in a second act of parasitism, which 
becomes itself the basis for a further act of theft by the cousin. And finally there 
is another interruption. One more parasite is waiting at the door to take their 
place at the purloined feast. 
Serres then goes on to remark: 
Look again at the diagram based on the story of the rats, paying attention 
to the succession of parasites in a stepladder formation, and ask yourself 
if something is added to the system, like a cancer of interceptions, flights, 
losses, holes, trapdoors – if it is a pathological growth in some spot or if it 
is quite simply the system itself. The rats climb onto the rug when the 
guests are not looking, when the lights are out, when the party’s over. Its 
nighttime, black. What happens would the obscure opposite of conscious 
and clear organization, happening behind everyone’s back, the dark side of 
the system. But what do we call these nocturnal processes? Are they 
destructive or constructive? What happens at night on the rug covered 
with crumbs? Is it a still active trace of (an) origin? Or it is only a 
remainder of failed suppressions? We can, undoubtedly, decide the 
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matter: the battle against rats is already lost; there is no house, ship, or 
palace that does not have its share. There is no system without parasites. 
This constant is a law. But how so? (Serres, 1982: 12, emphasis added)  
The nighttime activities of the rats, the parasites, constitute, for Serres, a ‘dark 
side of the system’. How to understand this phrase? We can start by rejecting a 
series of alternatives. Serres clearly does not locate the action of the rats as 
emanating from a source that is external to the system. This is no exogenous 
shock. The rats are not outsiders – they are internal to the very functioning of the 
system. Hence ‘there is no system without parasites’. Moreover, the ‘dark side of 
the system’ is not some hidden aspect, a topographical ‘underworld’ or 
‘unconscious’ that is suppressed from its normative functioning. Recently this 
notion of uncovering ‘the dark side of organization’ has taken hold in 
Management and Organization Studies (Raufflet & Mills, 2009; Tourish, 2013). 
Work in the area aims to bring to light ‘unseen’ or ‘dirty’ work (e.g. Ward & 
McMurry, 2015), or hidden and secret histories of organizations and their 
practices (Hanlon, 2015). But often it seems the only people who were actually 
unaware of these ‘dark sides’ were organization analysts. They were perfectly 
visible to those who had to routinely engage with them. All organizations engage 
to some degree in banal violence, humiliation and degradation in an entirely 
open fashion alongside their apparent formal good practices. This is not what 
Serres means by a ‘dark side of the system’. 
We need to think instead of the interdependency of the different aspect of the 
system with one another. The ‘dark side of the system’ could be thought of as 
that which enables, allows for, perhaps even calls for, the constitution of the 
apparent order of ‘conscious and clear organization’. This is the position that 
Bruno Latour works out in detail from We Have Never Been Modern onwards. 
Substituting the terms ‘purification’ and ‘hybridization’ for light and dark, Latour 
famously argues for two generalized modes of ordering being conducted in 
concert with one another. The ongoing work of producing dualisms brings with 
it an increased entanglement of relations. There are no systems that are not, at 
the same time, networks. There are no pure terms without the thousands of 
mediators through which they are accomplished. The problem is the denial of 
this practical reality in formal epistemology: 
The moderns have always been using both dimensions in practice, they 
have always been explicit about each of them, but they have never been 
explicit about the relation between the two sets of practices. Nonmoderns 
have to stress the relations between them if they are to understand both 
the moderns’ successes and their recent failure, and still not lapse into 
postmodernism. By deploying both dimensions at once, we may be able to 
accommodate the hybrids and give them a place, a name, a home, a 
philosophy, an ontology, and, I hope, a new constitution. (Latour, 1993: 
51) 
The gesture of ‘deploying both dimensions’ at once is auto-deconstructive. 
Merely placing a sketch of the network in the same space of that as the system 
demonstrates both the necessity and the impossibility of properly thinking their 
interdependency. The organization is hierarchies, goals, sub-systems and 
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functions. The organization is rhizomes, interceptions, quasi-objects and 
translations. A diagram of these two contradictory descriptions juxtaposed 
together invites a creative work of narrating the point where one slides into the 
other. Typically this takes the form of positing one dimension as the eventual 
limit of the other. Dualism, on this account, is what a network looks like in its 
most distended form, whilst translation becomes the mythic originary matrix in 
which opposed terms find their point of co-incidence and ‘originary’ co-
emergence.  
<insert figure 2 here> 
Fig 2. In the style of Latour, 1993, p.11 
The general point then seems to be something like the need to keep notions of 
‘conscious and clear organization’ simultaneously in play with the ‘dark side of 
the system’. Unraveling the system into a network can then analytically perform 
the breaking up of the idea of management. Summing the network back up into 
positions and functions does the reverse work of showing how complex sets of 
relations become simplified as apparent hierarchies and dichotomies. But at 
what point is the transition from one to the other accomplished? Travelling from 
one direction, we often go from one set of terms to another and so on, until the 
swarm of relations that emerges might just as well be called a network. Starting 
from the reverse direction, the network starts to implacably stack up so many 
loops and displacements that at a certain moment it is, of course, a system for all 
formal purposes.  
What is interesting about both directions of travel is that the transition point 
comes not in the middle of the account, but right at the end, as a sort of 
penultimate turning around on the analysis. Deleuze & Guattari (1983) once 
used the phrase ‘conjunctive synthesis’ to describe these kinds of naming 
practices – ‘Ah, so it’s this after all!’. They compared them to the burp of the 
freshly fed infant, a sign that indicates both a completion and transformative 
recapitulation of the process. So the system really was a network, after all was 
said and done. How strange, that all these relations and translations came to act 
as system, at the end of the day. The conjunctive synthesis is a kind of heavily 
scaffolded gestalt switch. In this respect, consider an image with which we are all 
familiar: 
<insert Figure 3 here> 
(Fig 3. E. Hill, Moja żona i moja teściowa, 1915, Creative Commons) 
The viewer starts with one picture, the thing they see first, either the old woman 
facing towards bottom left, or the young woman turned away towards the frame. 
To nudge the viewer from one image to the other, we typically point out key 
features. Look there, where the nose becomes a chin, the eye morphs into an ear, 
the mouth changes to a necklace. But despite this gradual preparatory work, the 
switch happens all at once: ‘Ah, so it’s….’. Critical work takes this same format. 
Extensive thick description prepares the ground for the penultimate ‘reveal’ 
where the organization changes, all at once, in its entirety (see Knox et al, 2015). 
To use the classical language of illusion popularized by Christopher Nolan’s film 
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The Prestige, the analytic breaking up management involves a) the pledge that 
there is a ‘dark side’ to the system; b) the turn of thick description of relations 
and c) the prestige of the eventual gestalt switch from system to network.  
But let us return for a moment to the two long quotes by Serres and Latour. A 
historical account of Actor-Network Theory might see the latter quote as the 
answer to the former. If we wish to cede the identification of two interdependent 
modes of ordering to Serres, then Latour’s efforts to demonstrate the necessity 
of thinking both the analytical and the constitutional places where these modes 
cross (and double-cross) one another gives us our contemporary critical 
position. However, what if the dark side of the system is just not its inversion 
into a network or the effect of the gestalt switch from one mode to another? 
What if there is another kind of emergent space, a third term between system 
and network? It would be difficult to perceive this kind of space, if it has any kind 
of existence at all, because it lies in the hinge or crossing space between the two 
terms. This would be a dark space not simply in terms or a reversal of what is 
usually perceived, but dark as a negation of perception entirely. 
The critique of management typically proceeds through continuous inversion, 
upending the organization this way and that to show how the two modes of 
‘light’ and ‘dark’ depend upon one another. It is this sense that critique can 
appear to be parasitic, in the common use of the term, since it attaches itself 
externally to its objects of study, and creates its own value through the 
demonstration of how to invert the image, now light, now dark. However, in 
doing so it leaves management pretty much untouched, since it does little to 
disrupt or destabilize the internal relation of ‘light’ and ‘dark’ to one another. 
What is required is not less parasitism, but a more effective form – an 
endoparasitic criticality that is capable of entering into management and 
organization practices, rather than just attaching to them externally, and seeking 
out the third spaces where reversals in modes of ordering occur. It is here, in 
interstitial spaces that emerge in the alternation between modes of ordering that 
a genuine disruption or breaking apart might not only located, but also fostered 
and encouraged. 
II 
China Miéville’s The City & The City begins as detective story. The story opens in 
the central European sounding city of Besźel with Tyador Borlú of the Extreme 
Crime Squad summoned to investigate a murder scene in a run down former 
industrial area. The narrative proceeds as one would expect, with the sifting of 
clues and the assigning of responsibilities, right until Borlú is preparing to 
depart: 
Rackhaus said something that I ignored. As I turned, I saw past the edges 
of the estate to the end of GunterStrász, between the dirty brick buildings. 
Trash moved in the wind. It might be anywhere. An elderly woman was 
walking slowly away from me in a shambling sway. She turned her head 
and looked at me. I was struck by her motion, and I met her eyes. I 
wondered if she wanted to tell me something. In my glance I took in her 
clothes, her way of walking, of holding herself, and looking. With a hard 
start, I realized that she was not on GunterStrász at all, and that I should 
 6 
not have seen her. Immediately and flustered I looked away, and she did 
the same with the same speed. I raised my head, towards an aircraft on its 
final descent. When after some seconds I looked back up, unnoticing the 
old woman stepping heavily away, I looked carefully instead of at her in 
the foreign street at the facades of the nearby and local GunterStrász, that 
depressed zone. (2009: 14) 
The woman who Borlú sees is not, in fact, in the same city. She is a resident of Ul 
Qoma, an entirely distinct city which, through a speculative fictional device 
which is never completely unpacked in the novel, is situated in the same 
topographical space as Besźel. Many parts of these two cities, superimposed on 
one another, appear to exist in something like parallel dimensions. One can be at 
the same geographical point in either city, and, for practical purposes, be 
unconcerned with the existence of the other. Both cities have their own 
particular history, culture, architecture and political system. They exist as 
something like independent sovereign states, with their own separate sets of 
international relations to the rest of the world: 
If someone needed to go to a house physically next door to their own but 
in a neighbouring city, it was in different road in an unfriendly power. 
That is what foreigners rarely understood. A Besź dweller cannot walk a 
few paces next door into an alter house without breach. But pass through 
Copula Hall and she or he might leave Besźel, and at the end of the hall 
come back to exactly (corporeally) where they had just been, but in 
another country, a tourist, a marveling visitor, to a street that shared the 
latitude-longitude of their own address, a street they had never visited 
before, whose architecture they had always unseen, to the Ul Qoman 
house sitting next to and a whole city away from their own building, 
unvisible there now they had come through, all the way across the breach, 
back home. (p. 86) 
Despite their topographical superimposition, there is only one place – a 
crossing/border point known as ‘Copula Hall’ – where it is permitted for 
residents of Besźel and Ul Qoma to cross to the other city. Proximal points, such 
as neighbouring house, are, in fact, topologically or relationally distant to one 
another, since they can only be legally reached through an enormous physical 
and political detour. But there are also other points of contact where the two 
cities meet in more ambiguous ways, known as ‘cross-hatched’ areas. Here the 
boundaries between Besźel and Ul Qoma can appear porous. Roads are shared, 
buildings appear to shade into another. Passersby in each city mingle together, 
present in the same topographical space, but oriented towards their own sets of 
distinct topological socio-material relations and coordinates.  
The central device of the novel concerns the separation of the two cities. Besźel 
and Ul Qoma are not merely distinct political entities, they are policed as 
divorced phenomenological realities. Residents of each city must maintain the 
boundaries between the two states by systematically ignoring or ‘unseeing’ the 
other: 
When an Ul Qoman stumbles into a Besź, each in their own city; if Ul 
Qoman’s dog runs up an sniffs a Besź passerby; a window broken in Ul 
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Qoma that leaves glass in the path of the Besź pedestrians – in all the 
cases the Besź (or Ul Qomans, in the converse circumstances) avoid the 
foreign difficulty as best they can without acknowledging it. Touch if they 
must, though not is better. Such polite stoic unsensing is the form for 
dealing with protubs – that is the Besź for those protuberances from the 
other city. (p. 80) 
The boundaries between the city are maintained by an individualized 
disciplining of the senses that becomes almost a reflex action. Citizens are 
inculcated into a regime of ‘un-seeing’, deliberately not noticing, along with ‘un-
hearing’, ‘un-smelling’ and so on. This requires considerable cultural and 
practical skill, particularly around shared roads, where drivers must orient to 
one another at the fringes of their perception, simultaneously ignoring and 
taking care of the position of their ‘topol-gangers’ in the other city. The extensive 
training of the senses is assisted by an agreed upon maintenance of distinct 
semiotic codes around speech, movement, dress and architecture for the two 
cities. Knowledge of these codes allows citizens to selectively focus their 
attention on their own city, backgrounding that of the other that impinges in a 
shadowy way on their fringes of their senses.  
Each city maintains its own juridical system. Whilst there are political points of 
contact between the two cities, in order to resolve disputes around shared 
resources, there is a separate mechanism that ensures compliance with 
‘unseeing’. Unauthorized crossing over between the two cities, through 
acknowledging ‘topol-gangers’, is known as ‘breach’. Breach is the name for both 
the act itself of violating the phenomenological and legal separation of the two 
cities and the mysterious power that enforces this separation: 
‘Breach’. ‘Breach’. I thought it was a shocked declaration by those who 
had witnessed the crime. But unclear figures emerged where there had 
been no purposeful instants before, only the milling of no ones, the 
aimless and the confused, and those suddenly appeared newcomers with 
faces so motionless I hardly recognized them as faces were saying the 
word. It was a statement of both crime and identity. (p.285-6) 
The relationship between the sovereign powers of the two cities and that of this 
strange third power that underwrites their separation is the principle thread to 
the story. In some histories, Besźel and Ul Quoma were once a single city, which 
at a certain point divided. The identity and fate of this autochthonic origin of the 
two cities – known as Orciny – has passed into myths that treated as either fairy 
stories for children or dangerous subversions. In some versions of the myth, 
Orciny did not fragment at all, but continues to exist as a hidden third space 
between the cities. Perhaps Orciny is actually the name through which Breach 
refers to itself. 
Two cities, then, functioning as distinct systems, with their own infrastructures 
and organizational forms, sat grosstopically in the same space. Between the two, 
a clear boundary which allows communication only through very specific 
institutional and diplomatically processes. Maintenance of the boundary ceded 
to a third, shadowy force which seems to exist as a third place that is both 
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everywhere – since the powers of observation and intervention that Breach 
enact appear almost limitless – and nowhere: 
THE BREACH WAS NOTHING. It is nothing. This is a commonplace; this is 
simple stuff. The Breach has no embassies, no army, no sites to see. The 
Breach has no currency. If you commit it it will envelop you. Breach is a 
void full of angry police. This trail that led and led again to Orciny 
suggested systematic transgression, secret para-rules, a parasite city 
where there should be nothing but nothing, nothing but Breach. (p.297) 
Breach is parasitic on Besźel and Ul Quoma. It has no sovereign powers of its 
own beyond its role in serving as the conditions of the formation of the two cities 
as political entities. Breach is nothing, is grounded in nothing, and has nothing to 
trade or even communicate beyond its own parasitic existence. This becomes 
clear late in the novel, when it is revealed that the ‘angry police’ who are 
recruited into Breach are effectively ‘press-ganged’ from the two cities. The 
transgressors become the next generation of border guards. Or as Breach put it 
simply: do what you will in your own cities, but if you breach then you’re ours. 
The boundary is nothing and nowhere, until it is revealed through the act of 
breach. And then it envelops you… 
What begins as a detective story then ends up a parable about how the co-
existence of two vastly different spaces is maintained by the withdrawing of the 
procedures for their maintenance into an in-sensible third space. The idea of a 
secret power – Orciny – proves to be a ruse. It is a device to attract critique and 
dissent and misdirect it across the boundary (the clues to find Orciny are always 
elsewhere, in the other city from where one is searching). Breach itself is not a 
secret, since it is always acknowledged. But its power to both disrupt and 
maintain, to break and reconnect, comes from its displacement. Breach alone 
provides the space for a deconstruction of the grosstopic arrangement of the two 
cities, whilst also providing the means for this ongoing continuation. As Tyador 
Borlú discovers, the only space that provides for a critique of Besźel and Ul 
Quoma is, literally, the nowhere space that exists between them. 
III 
Forensic psychiatric care is a practice for the management of persons with 
mental health issues who have either been accused of or convicted of criminal 
offences that exists outside of the penal system. It is usually embedded within 
the general hospital system, maintained in the UK through the National Health 
Service (NHS), rather than within prisons. There are three levels of secure care – 
high, medium, low – that are implemented in different sites. The highest level of 
care is reserved for service users who have typically been involved in a 
significant crime (or ‘index offence’) for which they are deemed either not 
responsible due to their mental health at the time, or unsuited to the prison 
system by virtue of their ongoing mental health issues. Patients at these sites will 
typically be in the system for decades rather than years. Medium-secure units 
are normally attached to hospitals, and act as sites where service users 
‘transition’ from the prison or legal system into psychiatric care, or downwards 
from high-security care. Time spent in medium-secure care can vary from 
around 3-15 years, depending on the rate of progress made in stabilizing the 
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patient’s mental health. Service-users in both high and medium secure care are 
formally detained under a Part 3 section of the Mental Health Act (i.e. 
‘sectioned’), and are not at liberty to leave until either a Mental Health Tribune 
or the Secretary of State (for convicted prisoners) deems it appropriate. Low 
secure care takes place in hostels and sheltered accommodation within the 
community, and represents the penultimate point in the rehabilitation process. 
The espoused logic of forensic mental health care is to enable the recovery of the 
patient to a sufficient level where they can either be returned back to prison or 
released into the community to engage with outpatient mental health services. 
The guiding principle that governs decisions around transitions through secure 
care is the assessment of the risk to self and risk to others on the part of the 
patient. Note that recovery is not equivalent to cure – once a diagnosis of a 
mental health condition has been made, the goal is to stabilize symptoms and 
behaviour to a degree where they can be self-managed (a common, albeit 
contestable, comparison is with diabetes). Secure care is very expensive to 
provide, especially in cases where there are complex needs, and there are 
financial and political pressures on service provision, leading to increasing 
reliance within the NHS upon out-sourced care with Charity and commercial 
providers. 
The following observations are based on empirical work in two medium-secure 
units located in a large city in the South of England (Brown et al, 2014; Reavey et 
al, n.d.). Medium-secure forensic psychiatric units look like prisons, and if they 
were not usually placed on hospital grounds you would easily mistake them as 
such. The walls and entry points to the unit are secure and designed to prevent 
unauthorized entry and exit. There are high walls, locked doors, airlock style 
entry systems, cameras and continuous staffing presence. Who and what goes in 
and out is closely monitored. This is ritualized in the practices of control and 
surveillance, including routine searches of wards and patient’s bedrooms. 
Entering the unit can take some time and is subject to the working patterns of 
nursing staff, many of whom are managing multiple and sometimes 
unpredictable demands on their time.  
Staff typically characterize their day-to-day activities in terms of the ‘calmness’ 
of the ward on which they are working (a medium-secure unit usually has 
around 6-8 individual wards which are divided by factors such gender, length of 
stay and diagnosis). A ‘calm ward’ is a general atmosphere defined by minimal 
agitation on the part of the patients and reasonably unproblematic relationships 
between patients and staff. Being able to sense changes in the atmosphere is a 
key skill that nursing staff develop, which draws upon sensitivity to a range of 
visual and auditory cues in the space of the ward (Kanyeredzi et al, n.d.). There 
are routine events that threaten the atmosphere, such as the admission of new 
patients transferring from prison and unsuccessful Mental Health Tribunals, 
along with daily activities such as mealtimes and arguments over the selection of 
channels on the communal television. Probably the single greatest challenge is 
the sheer lack of activities available to patients. Outside of semi-regular group 
sessions aimed at developing basic life skills, there is little by way of either 
therapeutic or recreation activities. Watching television communally or laying 
down in a bedroom comprises the major part of a patient’s day. 
 10 
The maintenance of a calm atmosphere on the ward, accomplished through the 
stabilization of patient behaviour, is then the primary practical goal sought by 
nursing staff. Whilst work on ward exposes staff to some dangers, such as being 
injured whilst intervening in patient’s behaviour, the primary risk is to the 
institution. Losing control over some aspect of the ward environment (e.g. the 
preparation of hot drinks) or of the ward itself is the most significant threat. 
There is then a disjunction between the espoused logic of the practice, which 
seeks patient recovery through minimization of risk to self and others, and the 
practical logic of running a ward, which aims at patient stabilization as a means 
of reducing risk to the institution.  
This divergence in logics can be illustrated in a number of ways. A ward is 
composed of a number of communal spaces, such as a central living area and a 
dining space, along with individual patient bedrooms and small meeting rooms 
(where appointments with consultant psychiatrists and tribunals are held). The 
nurses’ station is usually located at a central point, with clear lines of sight 
around the majority of the ward. Since nurses need access to records, computers 
and some medical supplies, part of the station will be within a lockable room, 
with large glass windows. On one occasion we were sat in the locked room 
waiting for an appointment. A number of nurses were present, updating the daily 
electronic records detailing the condition of patients on the ward. This was being 
done by cutting and pasting details from the previous day, and, where needed, 
making adjustments to the text. Whilst this was being done, a patient was 
repeatedly knocking on the door, requesting that staff give him access to an 
ironing board. He was initially ignored by the nurses, then discouraged. The door 
remained locked. We were told that responding to minor patient requests whilst 
within the room was counter-productive, since it simply encouraged more such 
requests, disrupting the flow of activities. The orderly management of 
interactions on the ward clearly took precedent over monitoring individual 
needs. 
A recent major complicating factor has been the imposition of a ban of smoking 
in both the inside and outside spaces in mental health units. Before the ban, it 
was common to observe patients clustering around the nurses’ station, waiting 
for a member of staff to accompany them to an outside space and provide them 
with a lighter to smoke. In many wards, staff developed informal work practices 
to routinize these requests through rotas or, even, we have been told, through a 
kind of ‘production line’ where queues of patients received a cigarette from one 
member of staff, which was lit by another, as they passed through the door to a 
garden space, before processing back inside. Clearly these practices are at odds 
with the health logic that underpins the goal of recovery. But they are consonant 
with the logic of maintaining a calm ward. Significant numbers of service users 
are smokers, who have large amounts of time with very little to do, and are 
legally prevented from doing the one thing that might alleviate their frustration. 
The informal management of smoking reduces collective aggravation between 
staff and patients (Matthews et al, 2005). 
Another instance of the tension between health agendas and staff routines is 
around kitchen spaces. For many service users, food is a major source of 
complaint. Meals are normally prepared outside the unit and are served 
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according to strict menus chosen well in advance (this is done in part to avoid 
arguments over choice and portion size when they are served). Not being able to 
choose either what or when to eat is a continuous source of patient 
dissatisfaction. This is often recognized on wards where patients are close to 
staged discharge, and where some facilities may be made available for selected 
patients to do some cooking for themselves. In one newly built unit, we observed 
that the design of wards included the provision of a small kitchen. However, 
when we asked patients how regularly they were able to make use of kitchens, 
we were told that they were rarely used (this was also apparent from their 
spotless condition). Cooking activities require a ratio of two staff members for 
every patient, ostensively because of the risks involved in access to kitchen 
equipment and cutlery. Losing the equivalent of four person hours of staff time 
for every session with two patients clearly detracts from the overall 
management of the ward. So for the majority of the time, the kitchens remain 
locked and patients can only stare in through the windows and imagine what 
they might have been able to do.  
The vast majority of wards are separated by patient gender. One of the rationales 
for this separation is the management of the risk of (hetero) sexual predation 
and exploitation amongst ‘vulnerable’ adults (Brown & Reavey, 2016). Personal 
and sexual relationships, whatever their orientation, are broadly discouraged 
and normally subject to sanction within medium-secure units. Nevertheless 
patients do engage in clandestine sexual activity with one another and form 
personal relationships. Staff are aware of these possibilities, and the ways in 
which particular ward designs may afford ‘blindspots’, or of the opportunities 
that leave to visit the hospital grounds may afford (e.g. sexual liaisons in public 
toilets). Whilst the institution itself cannot tolerate patient sexuality, because it is 
indexed to risk to self-and-others (Brown et al, 2014), nursing staff seem to 
tolerate moderate sexual banter and accept that patients progressing towards 
transition to the community are likely to engage in sexual activity (particularly 
on community visits). What is formally seen as threatening to recovery is treated 
as practically assisting stabilization as the patient moves through the forensic 
psychiatric system. 
Medium-secure units are then composed of (at least) two competing orders of 
reason, an espoused logic and a practical logic. For the most part, these co-exist 
and orient towards one another without having to declare their 
incommensurability. However, there are moments when the two orders seem to 
collapse into one another and a third kind of space briefly emerges. For example, 
modern ward designs place considerable emphasis on sightlines. Placing an open 
nurses station at the very centre of the ward, and then arranging communal 
spaces immediately around the station, with bedrooms and other rooms as 
‘spokes’ radiating out from the centre, means that staff who sit at the station can 
maintain surveillance over the greater part of the ward space. However, as 
mentioned previously, this apparent control over the ward exposes staff to 
continuous requests from patients, and as a consequence, nursing staff often 
place themselves in the locked office part of the station. Moreover, the control 
provided by the central location is reversible. As one staff member observed, it 
requires only one agitated patient, armed with a pen, to take a hostage at the 
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nurses station, for control to be ceded control, since the patient would now be 
able to take advantage of all the sightlines.  
The formal and the informal logics that are in play around the nurses station (e.g. 
the control of sightlines and the maintenance of work routines) are suspended or 
breached by the possibility of hostage taking. Power shifts away, if only 
temporarily, from both the control mechanisms of the institution and the 
informal management strategies of nursing staff. It becomes difficult to discern 
the difference between risk to self-and-others and risk to the institution, which 
merge into a critical situation. Admittedly, this kind of event is comparatively 
rare. It is ‘nothing’ compared to the routine dramas of life on the ward and yet it 
is ‘everything’ in respect to the coherency of the normal logics in play, since it 
threatens their separation. Why focus on recovery, when there is such an 
enormous risk? Why try to work towards a ‘calm’ atmosphere, when it can go so 
catastrophically wrong? The breach of hostage taking is like a shadow that 
reminds staff of just why it is that the formal and the informal cannot 
acknowledge one another, since to do so would make their particular versions of 
care mutually unworkable. Anticipation of this breach is then a major dynamic 
within the unit. Often unspoken, it is third order of reason all to itself that haunts 
and divides the other two. It represents both the transgression of the dual 
ordering of the ward, and the basis for their ongoing regulation. It is some sense 
both the ‘real’ site of management – the space that must be continuously 
anticipated within everyday decisions made on the ward – and the basis on 
which espoused management is disrupted. Because breach, the moment where 
the calmness of the ward collapses, really is the moment where the logics of risk 
and containment become undone.  
IV 
Definition 1:  
A ‘station’ or ‘position’ is a formally recognized site within an organization to 
which powers-to-act, responsibilities and accountability are accorded 
A ‘relation’ is a mode of connection between two stations that is characterized by 
a reciprocal movement of acting and being acted upon 
Proposition: 
Organizations are composed of stations and relations. Stations can be purely 
discursive objects (i.e. ‘vision statement’), material arrangements (i.e. ‘head 
office’) or, in the majority of cases, a mixture of both (i.e. ‘management’). 
Relations define stations through their continuous communication with one 
another. Stations present themselves as the ‘summing up’ of the relations 
through which they persist. 
Demonstration: 
No station can exist outside of a network of relationships to other stations, since 
such an existence would have no modes of connection and communication with 
other stations. Entering into a network subjects a given station to reciprocal 
definition and shaping by other stations. In this way, no station can ever acquire 
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an irreversible status, since it becomes dependent on the network of relations 
through which it acts and is acted upon.  
Corollary: 
If power is considered as power-to-act, any extension of the powers of a given 
station implies the growth of a network, which exposes the station to a greater 
range of reciprocal actions and increases its dependence on the network as a 
whole. 
Definition 2:  
‘Formal organization’ is primarily concerned with mapping the distribution of 
stations relative to one another. 
‘Informal organization’ concerns the multiplicity of relations that obtain between 
these stations and how they appear to the persons who occupy stations from 
their respective positions.  
Proposition:  
The representation of an organization differs entirely depending on whether it is 
stations or relations that are being mapped. Stations are considered to have an 
independent existence, by rights, outside of the relations in which they are 
embedded. Relations are, in practice, corrosive of the clear definition of stations. 
If the formal or espoused logic of an organization is presented in terms of the 
distribution of stations this will inevitably be insensitive to the actual forms of 
connectivity and communication through which an organization operates (i.e. 
how things actually get done). If the informal or practical logic of an organization 
is presented merely in terms of relations then it will fail to account for 
asymmetries in the distribution of rights and accountabilities. Moreover, any 
account of an organization that does not alternate between stations and relations 
will be unable to articulate their interdependency.  
Demonstration: 
Stations are defined by reference to an external process or agency, which 
accords them rights and formal powers in principle. This lends them the 
appearance of stability and completeness, since the act of definition does not 
necessarily depend on any internal process. But these external sources of 
definition do not by rights secure the practical means to act, creating a gap 
between status and effectivity. Relations are defined through internal processes 
within the network and are, in practice, subject to continuous, ongoing revision. 
Because they are not dependent on external authority, relations may appear to 
be both weak (in that they cannot necessarily draw upon outside sources of 
legitimation) and strong (in that they have a relative autonomy from outside 
forces). From this it is clear that any adequate representation of an organization 
will have to be concerned with both the external, de jure constitution of stations, 
and the internal, de facto working out of relations. 
Scholium: 
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The difficulty of containing descriptions of both stations and relations within a 
single account pushes the analyst towards dualism – formal vs informal; light vs 
dark; system vs network and so on. Moreover this dualism is a resource for 
organizational members themselves, who may readily alternate between 
accounts of ‘what should happen’ and ‘what actually happens’. This renders the 
connections between stations and relations ever more mysterious, as though 
they become one at various points through some kind of interactional alchemy. 
The task of the analyst then becomes that of stopping this alternation through 
seeking the moments when it breaks down or is acknowledged as temporarily 
impossible, through finding the space that serves as the catalyst.  
Definition 3: 
‘Parasitism’ is the interception of a relation between two stations. It diverts what 
flows through one relation into a new direction. A parasite typically does not 
have the status of a ‘station’, although some stations may deliberately seek to act 
in a parasitic mode.  
A ‘parasitic cascade’ occurs when one act of interception is interrupted by a 
further act. This creates a vulnerability that attracts further interceptions 
without a clear stopping rule. 
‘Value’ is the extraction from or redirection of a flow between two stations into a 
new direction.  
Proposition: 
Parasitism is an inevitable feature of the relational arrangement of stations. 
Because stations depend upon one another, they must risk a mode of connection 
or communication that passes through a medium which is not under their 
complete control (i.e. it is outside the definition of the station). Any given flow – 
of information, materials, affect or discourse – is a potential source of value to an 
external agent who is capable of grasping a portion of that flow, or redirecting 
some of it. Ergo: management is constituted through its own breaking. In some 
cases, ‘leaders’ may seek to act in a deliberately disruptive manner that renders 
them as equivalent to parasites, but with considerably less potential for novelty. 
Demonstration: 
Parasites extract value from the flows between stations and appear to offer 
nothing in return. Parasites differ considerably in scale to the stations whose 
relations they parasitise. As such, they may appear to be invisible, or at least 
‘unseeable’, to stations. Parasites exploit vulnerabilities in the relational 
structure of networks. There can be no network without the possibility of 
parasitism, since the power of a network depends upon its spread, which 
multiplies the points of attack. However, the enactment of parasitism creates a 
new relation, which multiplies the number of stations involved. The parasitic 
relation may, in turn, be parasitized by other parasites, which are able to discern 
novel sources of value in the extractive process. This process can be multiplied 
exponentially since, as a process internal to a network, there is in principle no 
external stopping rule to parasitism. 
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Corollary: 
We live with our parasites. The only sure defence against parasitism is to retreat 
from relations, which is, in effect, to break all connections to others. In a purely 
relational sense, power names the spread of networks, which is simultaneously 
the multiplication of the possibilities for parasitism. However, given the 
acknowledgement of parasitism within a given field of power, the position of 
maximum strength comes from the anticipation of parasitic cascades and the 
strategic positioning as the ‘last in line’ of all the parasites. Hence, organizations 
both anticipate the inevitability of parasitism and develop the means to 
parasitise their own parasites in such a way that they can manage and contain 
parasitic cascades.  
Definition 4:  
‘Copula’ are the acknowledged points of passage between two or more 
sociomaterial logics.  
The ‘dark side of the system’ properly names a place that it is in-between the 
formal and informal, the espoused and the practical, the system and the network. 
‘Breach space’ is the emergent ‘third space’ that occurs when a parasitic cascade 
interrupts the arrangement of stations and relations.  
Proposition: 
Organizations are composed of stations and relations, which are implicated in 
different modes of reason. Stations are distributed with reference to external 
authorities, whilst relations unfold according to an internal, emergent logic. The 
incommensurability of the logics of stations and relations is widely 
acknowledged within organizations, as is the need to alternate between logics on 
occasion. However, this acknowledgement masks a broader interdependency. 
This implies the existence of a ‘third space’ where both the two logics combine, 
mix together, or become difficult to separate, in a way that would otherwise be 
regarded as impossible. This occurs during moments of ‘breach’, where the 
divergence of the two logics is attenuated and collapsed. Such a space occurs 
during moments of interruption to both the formal and the informal sides of 
organization, where both become simultaneously paralysed and catalyzed to a 
novel mode of functioning. 
Demonstration: 
Despite their interdependency, it is difficult to describe the distribution of 
stations and the patterning of relations in a single account of organizational life. 
Members can readily acknowledge that ‘but of course’ it is necessary at times for 
there to be an alternation between logics. Whilst such copula points are typically 
not advocated within the logic itself, they are rarely treated as ‘secrets’ or 
entirely sanctionable matters. The ‘dark side’ of an organization is then neither a 
hidden internal structure, nor an as-yet-unmasked set of external relations, but 
rather a penumbral space at the limits of perception in which the two logics 
cohere. Ordinarily, this space is nowhere – it is not part of the mundane day-to-
day functioning of the organization. But its existence is a necessary moment of 
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concrescence where the co-existence of incompatible orders of reason is 
accomplished. It is during periods of crisis, when the relations between stations 
are parasitized, that the space temporarily emerges and is recognized as such. 
Parasitic cascades interrupt and disrupt the separation of the formal and the 
informal and create a superordinate threat to their mutual functioning.  
Definition 5:  
A ‘parasite’ is a form of agency that is initially smaller in scale and capacity-to-act 
than stations. Parasites do not typically exhaust or destroy their hosts. Their 
destructive power is often matched by their creative power.  
Proposition: 
Parasites are disruptive of the usual functioning of systems. They exploit 
vulnerabilities by finding ways of diverting small amounts of flows to create 
value. Parasites cannot produce order for themselves, but require there to be a 
prior form of order onto which they can latch. Organizations very rarely collapse 
under the weight of parasites, except under comparatively rare circumstances of 
uncontrollable parasitic cascades. Here, parasites can become sufficiently 
engorged as to overcome their host, but in doing so they merely become a vector 
of transmission for other, nimbler parasites. Although parasites appear to take 
without giving, because they create new forms of relationality, and force 
organizations to confront the incommensurability of stations and relations, they 
serve as catalysts for change.  
Demonstration:  
All organizations tolerate a certain degree of ‘leakiness’, in strategic, financial or 
material terms. The flows that compose an organization are always vulnerable to 
extraction by a third party. If this exploitation remains at a sufficiently small 
scale, the organization is unlikely to see the outright rejection of the parasite as a 
pressing priority. However, the possibility of the escalation of parasitism is a 
significant concern, and for this reason apparently minor events may become 
unduly important to the organization because of the anxiety around scaling up. 
This anticipation may have value to the organization, because it acts as driver for 
reviewing its own practices and relationships that lie outside its own networks. 
In the rare cases where the parasite actually takes the place of the organization, 
it rapidly becomes the target for immediate further parasitism. 
Scholium: 
Is a parasite a station or a relation? Probably neither, although some stations act 
in ‘parasitic’ manner, and some instances of parasitism become sufficient intense 
as to give rise to what appears to be a new station. Is parasitism a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
thing? The question is meaningless in itself. Parasitism inevitably happens and 
constitutes a threat and a cost to existing stations and relations, but draws out 
novel responses that can transform stations and multiply relations. Is the analyst 
a ‘parasite’? On most occasions, probably not, since the analyst rarely ‘breaks’ or 
‘paralyses’ any part of the organization, but instead typically latches onto an 
existing vectors of parasitism and thereby ‘parasitises the parasites’.  
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Definition 6: 
‘Anticipation’ is the imagining of possible futures based on the prolongation of 
the current logics in play and the potential challenges they may encounter. 
‘Anticipation of breach’ is an unspeakable acknowledgement of the collapse of 
different orders of reason into one another in emergent, yet predictable, events. 
Proposition: 
Organizations are principally driven by the anticipation of breach. Although 
these moments are comparatively rare, they cast a long shadow over the 
organization. In breach, the organization is forced to confront the 
incommensurability between the logics in play, and the necessity of their 
separation. Breach is a moment of collapse and recognition. Since the ongoing 
functioning of the organization relies precisely on the ‘unseeing’ of divergences 
in logic, despite tolerance of their mutual co-existence, breach presents itself as 
the unraveling of the coherence of the incompatible. But in the same way that the 
recognition of the inevitability of parasitism has a productive value, so the 
unspoken acknowledgement of breach does the work of enabling the 
organization to maintain an active engagement with its own contradictions. 
Demonstration: 
A given order of reason within an organization is defined against a second order, 
whose projects and values can only be tolerated if they are amenable to 
translation. In this way, orders of reason may cohere in an organization because 
it appears that everyone is signed up to the same objectives, despite the fact that 
these goals have been significantly re-imagined and re-purposed across the 
competing logics. Rather than being actively repressed, the incommensurability 
between logics remains acknowledged. The possibility of breach represents a 
moment where the separation of orders may collapse, revealing their mutual 
foundation in a project which is incomprehensible if it were to be subject to a 
single definition. Thus, avoidance of breach is an act that both restates the 
importance of the separation of logics and tacitly affirms their dependence. The 
avoidance of breach is therefore a major driving force within the organization. 
This might be considered as a third, unrepresentable and unspeakable order of 
reason that underpins those that are overtly in play. 
Afterword 
Dark organizational theory is a descriptive practice rooted in an ethnographic 
sensibility that focuses on the divergence between different orders of reason in 
organizational and institutional settings. It treats incommensurability not as an 
obstacle, but rather as an inevitable, functional aspect of organizational life. As 
Deleuze & Guattari (1983) once quipped ‘things work because they don’t work’. 
Coherence between diverse local orders of reason is a routine accomplishment. 
It does not come as a surprise to members that there are different agendas and 
modes of ordering in play that are not, in principle, easily resolved, and may in 
fact be seemingly at odds with the espoused purpose of the organization. Whilst 
there is intrinsic value, we would argue, in giving voice to ‘stories from the 
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frontline’ of modern organizational life, doing so does not amount to a critical 
work of revealing what was supposedly ‘hidden’. The contribution of dark 
organizational theory is instead to demonstrate that whilst competing 
sociomaterial logics can be generally acknowledged within an organization, their 
mutual co-existence requires a systematic work of ‘unseeing’ and ‘unsensing’ in 
everyday practice. This requires considerable ‘affective labour’ on the part of 
members who not only have to the face the challenge of enacting their own 
practice, but also ensuring that they ‘disattend’ as far as possible to the rival 
logics that are in play (even when these alternative logics are potentially 
compelling). The focus is then on the local, contingent work of producing 
coherence in organizational and institutional settings that teeter on the verge of 
continuous incoherence. 
Despite their incommensurability, sociomaterial logics have forms of 
interdependency. Some are clearly marked as agreed points of passage or 
‘copula’, but other broader forms of interdependence only fully emerge at 
moments of ‘breach’, where a reversibility and collapse between logics occurs. 
Breach is an interruption or ‘parasitism’ of established relations that cuts across 
the differences of logics. It creates a temporary and unstable ‘third space’ of 
mixture where a new form of order is extracted, to the cost of the organization. 
Breach presents as a threat to the whole range of local modes of ordering and 
compels a response that inverts their existing logics (although it often concludes 
with the transformation and reaffirmation of incommensurability). The central 
proposition of dark organization theory is that anticipation of breach, rather 
than the specific goals of ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ organizing, is of central 
significance for understanding why organizations do what they do.  
Critique then needs to begin by becoming attuned to when and how breach is 
possible, learning from the affective practices of members who are skilled in its 
anticipation. The moments where management – in its broadest sense – faces its 
own breakdown become pivotal to understanding how the organization goes on. 
The analyst has to learn to think like the parasite, pursue a kind of ‘parasite logic’ 
(see Brown, 2013) in their investigations. Dark organizational theory is not a 
theory as such, although it can be presented as a set of conceptual propositions3. 
It does not lend itself to easy empirical application, although it enhances 
sensitivity to ‘third spaces’. It does not bring us any closer to what management 
is ‘actually’ doing. But it suggests, with some plausibility, we want to claim, tell us 
what it is that managers and the managed glimpse for a moment when they 
forget what it is that are supposed to be looking at.  
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1 The term ‘competing logics’ refers here to the relationship between diverse 
modes of constituting sociomaterial ‘objects’ (e.g. ‘good care’, ‘reduction of risk’, 
‘recovery’) and ‘subjects’ (‘patient with self-insight’, ‘empathic carer’) within a 
specific practice, along with the ‘rationales’ that emerge within the mode (see 
Mol, 2008). This differs from the notion of an ‘institutional logic’ as a higher-level 
belief system rendered operant within a practice by way of a focus on both the 
emergent nature of the mode of ordering, and the manner in which meaning 
emerges through the local and provisional concrescence of subject and objects 
(e.g. shifts in the funding of care result in ongoing transformations of what 
counts as recovery and effective doctoring/nursing).   
2 The idea of ‘the third’ or ‘thirdness’ has a long history in the humanities and 
social sciences, including the postcolonial theory of Homi Bhabha (2004) and 
Edward Soja’s (1996) ‘thirdspace’. The common thread there is that of mixture 
and the confrontation with alterity. In the context of ‘dark organization theory’, 
thirdness refers to the anticipation and temporary emergence of a space where 
the incommensurability of logics becomes starkly apparent and can no longer be 
adequately managed. It is informed directly by Michel Serres’ concern with the 
impossible origins of multiplicity – i.e. ‘trampled multiplicity’, ‘clinamen’, 
‘parasitic cascades’ (see Brown, 2002). 
3 The extent to which these propositions draw heavily on Serres (1982) should 
be readily apparent. 
